District-local municipal relations: The challenges to cooperative government by Steytler, Nico & Jordan, Janis
 
 
DISTRICT-LOCAL MUNICIPAL RELATIONS: 
THE CHALLENGES TO COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
Professor Nico Steytler 
Ms Janis Jordan 
 
Local Government Project 
Community Law Centre 






                              
CAGE Project 
The Local Government Project at the Community Law Centre is conducting 
research on the key areas of conflict that arise between district and local 
municipalities. This research is part of a project on Managing Concurrency 
of Powers and Functions thorough Cooperative Government. Funding was 
contributed by the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE), a project of 
National Treasury, which is funded by the European Union under the 
European Programme for Reconstruction and Development.
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT................................................................................................ 3 
1.2 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 3 
2. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRICT AND 
LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES ........................................................................................... 4 
2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK – EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE SERVICE DELIVERY 4 
2.2 WHITE PAPER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT – COORDINATION, SUPPORT AND 
EQUALIZATION ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.3 MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ACT 117 OF 1998 – REFLECTING THE WHITE PAPER’S 
VISION.............................................................................................................................. 6 
2.4 MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES AMENDMENT ACT 33 OF 2000 – CHANGING COURSE ......... 7 
2.5 MANAGING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DISTRICT AND LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES ........... 7 
2.5.1 District Council.................................................................................................. 7 
2.5.2 District intergovernmental forums..................................................................... 7 
2.5.3. Provincial role .................................................................................................. 8 
2.6  INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS ...................................................... 8 
3. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIVISION OF POWERS OF 
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS......................................................................................... 9 
3.1 MOVING BEYOND THE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY ............................................................. 9 
3.2 CONTENT OF OVERLAPPING ACTIVITIES SUCH AS “REGULATION” AND “STRATEGY” .. 9 
3.3 OVERINCLUSIVE DEFINITIONS .................................................................................... 9 
4. THE PRACTICE OF DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ...................................... 10 
4.1 MINISTERIAL AUTHORIZATIONS ............................................................................... 10 
4.2 PROVINCIAL ADJUSTMENTS...................................................................................... 11 
4.3 DISTRICT EXPENDITURE ........................................................................................... 12 
5. CAUSES OF CONFLICT ...................................................................................... 13 
5.1 ROLE DEFINITION – INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 84 OF THE STRUCTURES ACT...... 13 
5.2 ROLE ALLOCATION – SHIFTING OF FUNCTIONS ......................................................... 14 
5.3 REDISTRIBUTIVE FUNCTION OF DISTRICTS................................................................ 16 
5.4 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SERVICES RENDERED............................................................ 17 
5.5 POLITICAL DIFFERENCES .......................................................................................... 17 
5.6 CAPACITY STATUS.................................................................................................... 18 
5.7 OVERLORDING ......................................................................................................... 19 
5.8 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 19 
6. MANAGING CONFLICTS ................................................................................... 20 
6.1 NATURE OF CONFLICTS ............................................................................................ 20 
6.2 CLARIFICATION OF POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ............. 21 
6.2.1 Framework for definitions ..................................Error! Bookmark not defined. 
6.2.2 Towards defining district powers and functions.Error! Bookmark not defined. 
 1
6.3 DISTRICT INTERGOVERNMENTAL FORUMS (DIFS) .................................................... 22 
6.4 FURTHER RESEARCH................................................................................................. 23 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................... 24 
8. ANNEXURE 1: Section 84 Structures Act and executive authority to shift  
powers and functions ...................................................................................................... 27 





1.1 Problem statement 
 
Outside of metropolitan areas, local government is shared by district and local 
municipalities; the 47 district municipalities and 231 local municipalities share 
legislative and administrative powers over the same geographical area. This 
overlapping jurisdiction was bound to raise questions regarding its functionality. 
 
The system of local government is premised on cooperation and a productive 
atmosphere between district and local municipalities. It has been noted by the 
National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Local Government that the relationship 
between district and local municipalities varies from “cordial and cooperative to 
conflictual and unproductive”.1 The Western Cape branch of the South African 
Association for Local Government (SALGA) noted in their minutes2 that there is “an 
unwillingness to interact in a cooperative way” among district and local councils. A 
member of the Free State Provincial Department of Local Government3 noted that 
relations between the district and local municipalities counted among the reasons for 
the bad state of local government in the province. These examples illustrate the urgent 
need to address the state of relationships between district and local institutions.  
 
This question is what causes conflict and ultimate unproductiveness? Having 
identified key areas of conflict, the next question to be addressed is: how are these 
conflicts managed? This question is pertinent in light of the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act4 (IRFA) which requires the establishment of District 
Intergovernmental Forums (DIFs) aimed at managing such relations. The object of 
this study is thus the identification of the challenges that DIFs must meet. This paper 
must be read with the “Status quo report on intergovernmental relations regarding 
local government”, prepared by the Local Government Project, which focuses on the 
incidence and functioning of intergovernmental forums at district level prior to the 
IRPA coming into operation  
 
1.2 Methodology  
 
In this investigation three sources of information were used. First, a literature survey 
was done with regard to parliamentary and government papers, both published and 
unpublished. Second, a questionnaire was sent to the district municipalities of the 
Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern Cape, Mpumalanga, Free State 
(with the exception of Lejweleputswa district municipality) and North West (with the 
exception of Central district municipality).5 Two responses were returned by district 
municipalities– Cacadu in the Eastern Cape and Siyanda in the Northern Cape. 
                                                 
1 National Assembly 2003, 9. 
2 Salga Western Cape June 2005, meeting minutes, 26. 
3 Mr T Mathamaho, personal communication. 
4 Act 13 of 2005. 
5 For ease of reading, the names of all municipalities are italicized. 
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Thirdly, on-site interviews were conducted with district municipalities and their local 
municipalities. The questions guiding the interview included the following: 
• The extent to which the overlap of functions given to district and local 
municipalities affects their relationship. 
• The particular functional areas (as listed in s 84 of the Municipal Structures 
Act) that pose a problem to the relationship between district and local 
municipalities6 
• The methods used to resolve conflicts between the municipalities.  
• The linkage that local councillors provide in the district council, the reporting 
mechanism between district and local councils, and their effectiveness. 
 
Interviews were conducted with respondents from organized local government and the 
provincial departments for local government in the Free State, Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
There are some methodological caveats to a study such as this. First, documentary 
research relies on generalized or region-specific observations. On-site interviews were 
a sobering facet to generalizations, yet, this introduces further caveats. Interviews 
were not always conducted with the political principals or the municipal managers.  
 
2. POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRICT AND 
LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES7 
 
Shared authority in local government was first introduced in the 1996 Constitution.8 
While the references in the Constitution to municipalities sharing authority over the 
same area are skeletal, the concept was further elaborated in the White Paper on Local 
Government,9 issued in 1998. By the end of that year, this vision resulted in the 
Municipal Structures Act.10 However, amendments to the Act made fundamental 
changes to the original vision, even before the new system of district and local 
municipalities came into being on 5 December 2000 with the first election of the new 
councils.11
 
The new model that merged sees district municipalities as direct service providers, 
deviating considerably from the original idea of them as coordinator, supporter and 
equalizer between local municipalities. This model is, however, flexible as a district’s 
service delivery role depends in large part on the capacity of both the districts and its 
local municipalities.  
 
2.1 Constitutional framework – equitable and sustainable service delivery 
 
 
                                                 
6 Act 117 of 1998 
7 Steytler 2003. 
8 Act 108 of 1996. 
9 Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998. 
10 Steytler 2000. 
11 Municipal Structures Amendment Act 33 of 2000. 
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The Constitution contained three categories of municipalities – A, B and C. While 
Category A was a self-standing municipality, "shared" local authority was created for 
the areas falling outside Category A municipal areas (metropolitan areas). Section 
155(1)(b) states that a Category B municipality is "a municipality that shares 
municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a Category C 
municipality within whose area it falls."12 This means that a Category B municipality 
shares its powers and functions, as listed in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5, with a 
Category C municipality.  
 
The Constitution left the division of authority between Category B and C 
municipalities to Parliament. Section 155(3)(c) provides that national legislation must 
"make provision for an appropriate division of powers and functions between 
municipalities when an area has municipalities of both category B and category C."  
Three sets of criteria are provided to give effect to the "appropriate division" of 
powers and functions. First, the division is subject to section 229 of the Constitution 
that provides a set of criteria for the division of fiscal powers. Second, section 155(4) 
provides that the national legislation "must take into account the need to provide 
municipal services on an equitable and sustainable manner." Third, section 155(3)(c) 
allows an asymmetrical division of powers.  
 
The broad and imprecise criteria of equitable and sustainable service delivery in terms 
of section 155(4) must be interpreted in the context of the Constitution. The term 
"equitable" means that the allocation of resources is according to need; the 
redistribution of services from well-serviced areas to under serviced areas.13 The 
reference to "sustainable" services, also an object of local government listed in section 
151, is to ensure service delivery based on a municipality capacity to finance such 
services from its own funds. The explicit purposes of a district municipality can thus 
be described as follows: a district municipality must, first, redistribute resources 
within a district according to need; second, assist and capacitate local municipalities 
in order for them to provide, and sustain the provision of, services in their areas; third, 
promote economic development in the district since sustainability of the provision of 
services (as well as the general well-being of the inhabitants) is dependent upon a 
productive local economy. 
 
Because the purposes of a district municipality is to respond to need and capacity of 
local municipalities, the Constitution foresees and permits that the district 
municipality may play a different role in respect of each local municipality in its 
district. The division of functions and powers between the district municipality and a 
local municipality in the district can be asymmetrical depending on need and capacity. 
 
 
                                                 




2.2 White Paper on Local Government – coordination, support and equalization 
 
The White Paper on Local Government articulated the following roles of district 
municipalities:14
• building local municipalities where there is no capacity; 
• initiating economic development of the district;  
• planning land-use in the district; and 
• Providing in the basic needs of people living in deprived areas. 
 
Central to its coordinating function stands integrated development planning for the 
district as a whole. This is achieved by harmonising and rationalising local 
municipalities' integrated development plans (IDPs) with regard to land-use planning, 
economic planning and development, and transport planning. A second principal 
function is to provide economies of scale in service delivery; bulk-services are to be 
provided to local municipalities, such as waste water and sewerage. A further function 
is to provide municipal services directly to areas where, due to low population 
density, no local municipality can be established. The vision of district municipalities 
that the White Paper portrays was thus one of a coordinator, initiator of development 
and, as the last resort, the provider of services directly to the public. 
 
2.3 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 – reflecting the White Paper’s vision 
 
The Municipal Structures Act (MSA), as initially enacted, reflected the overall roles 
and functions identified in the White Paper.15 However, a significant shift occurred in 
the Municipal Structures Amendment Act of 2000, transforming the district 
municipality from a co-ordinator and provider of bulk services to that of service 
provider to end-users.  
 
Section 83(3) lists the overall purposes of district municipalities as seeking “seeking 
to achieve the integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic development 
of its area as a whole." This purpose entails, first, that districts must see to that 
development planning and services in the district cohere. Second, districts must 
promote bulk infrastructural development and services for the district as a whole and 
build capacity of local municipalities where it is lacking. Third, the equitable 
distribution of resources between the local municipalities must be promoted to ensure 
appropriate levels of municipal services within the district.   
 
As in the White Paper, the district municipality is seen as the coordinator of the 
district and bulk supplier of services and only a direct service provider in district 
management areas. 
 
In section 84 of the MSA, the local government competencies, listed in Schedules 4B 
and 5B of the Constitution, are divided between district and local municipalities. The 
method used is to list all the functions and powers of district municipalities and leave 
the residue of the Schedule 4B and 5B competencies to the local municipalities.  
                                                 
14 Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998, 69-72. 
15 De Visser 1999. 
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2.4 Municipal Structures Amendment Act 33 of 2000 – changing course 
 
An amendment to the Structures Act, effected shortly before the municipal elections 
in December 2000 radically changed the role of the district municipalities. District 
municipalities now become, to the exclusion of local municipalities, responsible for – 
• Potable water supply systems; 
• Bulk supply of electricity (including the transmission, distribution and, where 
applicable, the generation of electricity); 
• Domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems; and 
• Municipal health services. 
 
Accompanying these allocations was the provision that the national Minister of 
Provincial and Local Government may shift the functions back to local municipalities 
in the future. The new system thus allowed for great variation in the number and type 
of functions the 46 district municipalities perform, resulting in, as shown below, a de 
facto asymmetrical system of allocation across districts.   
 
2.5 Managing the relations between district and local municipalities 
 
A number of processes and structures have been established by law to manage the 
relations between two municipalities exercising jurisdiction over the same 
geographical area. First, the relationship should be one of mutual support and 
coordination. The MSA thus obliges district and local municipalities to support one 
another at the request of either.16 The most important aspect of the relationship is 
probably the drafting of a district-wide IDP.  There are also a number of structures 
that must give effect to the objectives of mutual support and coordination. The most 
important structure is the district council itself.  
 
2.5.1 District Council 
 
The composition of the district council reflects that the district municipality is the sum 
of the local municipalities and the electorate of the district as a whole. Sixty per cent 
of the council is indirectly elected to the council by the local councils in the district in 
proportion to the numbers of voters in their local municipality. The remaining forty 
per cent is directly elected, proportionally representing the voters in a district, 
including a district management area. The council is thus composed of both 
representatives of the local municipalities and representatives of the district electorate. 
Given the 60 per cent weighting in favour of local municipalities, the balance of 
power should lie with the local municipalities and district councils should be subject 
to local municipal authority. Despite this structural bias in favour of the local 
municipalities, this has not had the required effect; relations between the two 
municipalities have often been characterized by strife.  
 
2.5.2 District intergovernmental forums 
                                                 
16 S 88(1). 
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In a large number of districts, informal intergovernmental forums have sprung up to 
promote cooperation between the district and the local municipalities.17 Their 
functioning is out in the accompanying Centre report on “Status quo report on 
intergovernmental relations regarding local government”. The IRFA has 
institutionalized these forums in a new executive intergovernmental relations structure 
for each district. A district intergovernmental forum (DIF) must be established, 
consisting of the mayors of the district and local municipalities. The district mayor 
chairs this forum to discuss “matters of mutual interest”. The objects of these forums 
and their functioning are set out in the accompanying paper mentioned above. 
  
2.5.3. Provincial role  
 
Provinces are given a limited yet significant role in managing the relationship 
between districts and locals.  The MEC for local government must support the district 
municipality to give effect to its constitutional duty of supporting its constituent local 
municipalities. 18
 
More interventionist is the provincial role in managing conflicts that may arise over 
the allocation of powers and functions, given the fact that these definitions in the 
MSA are not detailed. The MSA stipulates that in the event of a dispute arising 
between a district and local municipality, the MEC must define the roles. This 
provincial responsibility takes effect only after the conflict has occurred and the 
assistance of the MEC is requested. 
 
2.6  Integrated development planning process 
 
One of the key areas where close cooperation is required between the district and the 
local municipalities is in the design of the district IDP. In terms of the Municipal 
Systems Act (Systems Act) each district municipality must adopt a framework for 
integrated development planning of the area as a whole.19 The importance of the 
district IDP framework is that it binds both the district and the local municipalities.20 
The framework must address those matters that that require alignment between 
municipalities. It must also specify the principles to be applied and coordinate the 
approach to be adapted to those matters. The framework must then determine 
procedures for consultation between the municipalities when they are drafting their 
own IDPs.  
 
The provinces are tasked to assist the municipalities in the drafting process. The MEC 
for local government may facilitate the coordination and alignment of Integrated 
Development Planning (IDP) of a district municipality and local municipality. 
Further, under the Systems Act the MEC may take steps to bring resolution to 
                                                 
17 Steytler, Fessha & Kirkby 2005. 
18 S 89(3). 
19 Act 32 of 2000, s 27(1).  
20 S 27(2). 
 8
disputes or differences that arise in connection with planning, drafting, adoption or 
review of the IDP between a district and local municipality.21   
 
3. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIVISION OF POWERS OF 
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
As pointed out above, the division of powers and functions between district and local 
government entail identifying from the list of functional areas in Schedules 4B and 5B 
those areas that fall within the domain of the district municipalities, while leaving the 
remainder to local municipalities. 
 
It is quite apparent from the reading of section 84(1) of the MSA and the Schedules 
that the division is neither precise nor detailed. Indeed, one of the reasons that 
prompted the revision of section 84 in 2000 was to obtain greater clarity. The 
following difficulties can be identified.  
 
3.1 Moving beyond the local municipality 
 
A number of phrases in section 84(1) of the MSA seek to distinguish between 
functions or services that extend beyond a single local municipality. The phrase 
“serving the district area as a whole” applies to the following functional areas: 
• “roads that from an integral part of a road transport system for the area of the 
district municipality as a whole”; 
• Fire fighting services; and 
• Promotion of local tourism. 
 
Whether a service is for district as whole, is an interpretive question, open to the 
interpretation of the different municipalities. Equally difficult is to find the exact 
ambit of the phrase: “Serving the area of a major proportion of the municipalities in 
the district”. This applies to fresh produce markets and abattoirs, cemeteries and 
crematoria. What a “major proportion” is, require again a judgment based on facts and 
policy consideration. The easiest qualification is the reference to more than one local 
municipality with reference to “solid waste disposal sites, bulk waste transfer 
facilities, waste disposal facilities”. 
 
3.2 Content of overlapping activities such as “regulation” and “strategy” 
 
District municipalities are given broad district-wide functions, such as “to regulate” or 
“stategise”, that of necessity overlap with local functions. It is not always easy to 
distinguish the “higher” level of activity of the district municipality from the 
implementation activities of the locals. The function to “regulate passenger services” 
impacts on locals’ competencies relating to “municipal public transport”. Likewise, 
determination of strategy with regard to waste disposal overlaps with each local’s 
competency relating “refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal”. 
 
3.3 Over inclusive definitions 
                                                 
21 S 31. 
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Depending on the definition given to a district function it may overlap with a local 
function. The clearest example is the statutory definition of “municipal health 
services”.  The National Health Act’s definition overlaps with local functions (given 
in brackets):  
(a) water quality monitoring; 
(b) food control (which overlaps with “licensing and control of undertakings that 
sell food to the public”); 
(c) waste management (which overlaps with local aspects of  “solid waste 
disposal sites”) 
(d) health surveillance of premises (which overlaps with “local amenities”, 
“markets”, etc); 
(e) environmental pollution control (which overlaps with “air pollution”, “noise 
pollution”, “refuse removal”, etc); and 
(f) disposal of the dead (which overlaps with local functions of “facilities for the 
accommodation, care and burial of animals” and “local cemeteries and 
crematoria”). 
 
This imposed definition, then, results in a number of points of conflict between 
district and local municipalities.  
 
4. THE PRACTICE OF DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES 
 
When the 46 district municipalities were established in December 2000, some had to 
start from scratch, while other continued along the line of their preceding regional 
councils. Despite the provisions of the Structures Act, their functions were largely 
determined by executive decisions of the Minister and the MECs. 
 
4.1 Ministerial authorizations 
 
In December 2000 the Minister authorized local municipalities to continue performing 
these district functions for a two and a half year transition period ending 30 June 
2003.22 In January 2003 the Minister revoked his previous authorisations and dealt 
with each of the four functional areas separately. With regard to the bulk supply of 
electricity the local municipalities will continue to provide the services until the 
national restructuring of the industry is completed.23 Municipal health services have 
been defined as environmental health and are to be performed by the district 
municipalities. A district municipality may, however, request local municipalities to 
perform the function on its behalf.24 With regard to water and sewage functions, the 
Minister dealt with them on a provincial basis taking the particular circumstances of 
each into account. For example, all the local municipalities in Gauteng, Free State, 
Northern Cape and the Western Cape will continue to provide bulk water supply and 
sewage purification, while in the Eastern Cape, only two local municipalities will do 
so. A similar pattern is apparent in KwaZulu-Natal; only the local municipalities that 
                                                 
22 Mare 2003. 
23 Johnson 2002. 
24 Mare 2003. 
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include Pietermaritzburg, Richards Bay and Newcastle will perform bulk water 
supply and sewage purification functions. In Limpopo the district municipalities 
retain authority over bulk water supply and sanitation except for the local 
municipalities in one district and the capital town of Polokwane. In Mpumalanga local 
municipalities in three of the four districts will perform the water and sewage 
function. In North West that is the position in two districts while in the Northern Cape 
local municipalities in only one district are authorised to perform the bulk water 
supply and sewage purification work functions. The new authorization took effect on 
1 July 2003. 
 
4.2 Provincial adjustments 
 
For the other functions, on the establishment of the new municipalities, the MECs 
sought to maintain the status quo; the local municipalities were authorized to continue 
with the functions previously preformed by the transitional local councils before 
December 2000. During the course of the last two years, MECs in the provinces have, 
with a few exceptions, allocated the powers and functions of refuse removal, local 
municipal roads and community services to local municipalities.25
 
Since 2003 the MDB has done a yearly capacity assessment of all district and local 
municipalities and made recommendations to the various MECs to which some 
responded and adjusted the powers between the two categories of municipalities. 
According to the MDB 26 on the status quo of adjusted functions, the most commonly 
adjusted district functions since 2002 were that of solid waste removal and control of 
cemeteries and crematoria .27 The effect of this provincial executive power is that 
there are some differences between the powers exercised by district and local 
municipalities in different provinces. 
 
The MDB reports that more than 80 per cent of local municipalities in the Eastern 
Cape, Free State and Mpumalanga have the solid waste removal function adjusted to 
them. Similarly, 80 per cent or more of the local municipalities in the Eastern Cape, 
Free State, Mpumalanga and North West Province are empowered to perform the 
control of cemeteries and crematoria function. It is for this reason that the MDB 
recommends restoring the adjusted function to the district municipality because it 
would not have an impact on service delivery. 
 
Table 1 reflects the number of local municipalities performing priority 1 functions, 
namely the most important municipal functions.  
 
Table 1: Priority 1 functions performed by local municipalities 
Function Number of 
municipalities 
National percentage 
Cemeteries 183 79.2 
Electricity reticulation 160 69.3 
                                                 
25 Department of Provincial and Local Government 2004, 7. 
26 Municipal Demarcation Board 2005a, 20. 
27 S 84(1)(e) ‘solid waste removal’ & s 84(1)(l) ‘control of cemeteries and crematoria’. 
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Fire fighting 130 56.3 
Municipal health services 106 45.6 
Municipal planning 123 53.2 
Municipal roads 189 81.8 
 Refuse removal 189 81.8 
Sanitation 158 68.4 
Storm water drainage 159 68.8 
Traffic and parking 149 64.5 
Water (potable) 165 71.4 
Source: Municipal Demarcation Board 2005, 31 
 
4.3 District expenditure 
 
This limited number of functions that districts perform correlates with their 
expenditure. In the National Treasury report Trends in Intergovernmental Finances,28 
the operating and capital budgets of the three categories of municipality are given as 
follows:  
 
Table 2: Budgets by category of municipality, 2003-04  
































Total 69 286 16 687 85 974 80.6% 19.4% 
Source: National Treasury 2004, 24 
 
It is clear that the operating budgets of district municipalities are small in comparison 
with the operating budgets of local municipalities. Almost half of their budgets are 
spent on capital projects. 
 
The size of the district budgets reflects that they are not providing the main trading 
services (water, electricity, sanitation), which are the main source of municipal 
revenue and on which user charges can be levied.29  
 
Given how the legal framework has been implemented, the focus of the inquiry turns 
now to the relations between district and local municipalities. As noted above, the 
relationships have not been characterized by harmony and cooperation. What, then, 
                                                 
28 National Treasury 2004. 
29 National Treasury 2004, 26. 
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are the structural and operational factors that may cause conflict? It is important to 
identify the root causes because it is within this environment that the new DIFs must 
operate and, most importantly, effect changes for the better. 
 
5. CAUSES OF CONFLICT  
 
As noted above, in a number of official reports and documents, concern is expressed 
about the working relationship between district and local municipalities. The picture 
that emerges, however, is ambiguous; in some districts the relations are good and 
productive, in others not.  
 
Examining the reasons for success indicates the causes of unproductive relations. The 
Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government identified certain general 
conditions that indicate the likely efficiency of the two-tier system in any given 
district. 30 Crucial factors for good relations included:  
• the current boundaries are not substantially different to the old Regional 
Services Council boundary;  
• the district municipality is built on the established regional services council;  
• there is good quality leadership;  
• there are effective structures that bring together mayors, municipal managers 
and senior officials in the area;  
• mayors serve on the district council;  
• there is consensus concerning distribution of financial resources; and  
• there is a good understanding of legislation and policies.  
 
In the above-mentioned instances, the district-local relations could be described as 
“very good and beneficial”.31 In many districts these conditions do not prevail, 
resulting in “conflictual and unproductive”32 relations. Most districts are new 
creations, IGR structures are not in place and distribution of financial sources is the 
cause of conflict. This study now seeks to identify key factors that cause conflict in 
relations between district and local municipalities.  
 
5.1 Role definition – interpretation of section 84 of the Structures Act 
 
The lack of clarity in the division of powers and functions between district and local 
municipalities is a major cause of conflict. In a survey conducted by the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP), although over 80 percent of the district and local 
municipalities that responded (less than half of all municipalities) nearly all of them 
(98 per cent) claimed that the greatest challenge was misunderstandings of the nature 
of the two-tiered district-local system.33 Nearly half of the responded cited indistinct 
role clarification was a problem besetting intergovernmental relations.  
 
                                                 
30 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 14. 
31 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 12. 
32 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 9. 
33 National Council of Provinces 2005, 15. 
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It is not difficult to appreciate that there is uncertainty as to the scope and technical 
meaning of section 84(1) of the Structures Act which sets out the district functions. 
As noted above, the definitions of section 84(1) contain at least three kinds of 
difficulties: first, the distinction when a matter is no longer a local matter but a district 
one; second, the broad definition of some functions; and third, the over inclusiveness 
given to some district powers. In all these cases an overlap of functions occurs. 
 
The MDB34 has suggested that local government functions could be classified into 
three categories: district, shared and local. Some functions are clearly applicable only 
to district or local municipalities, but there are a significant number of shared 
functions, that is, functional areas in which both the district and the local may operate. 
The MDB’s list of shared functions includes: 
• Fire-fighting services 
• Local tourism 
• Municipal airports 
• Municipal planning 
• Municipal public transport 
• Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 
• Markets 
• Municipal abattoirs 
• Municipal roads 
• Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal. 
 
It is not surprising that these shared functions are those mentioned by the respondents 
in the interviews as causing conflict. The former mayor of a district municipality 
(currently the manager of tourism) stated that there is no certainty about the district’s 
function of “promotion of local tourism in the area of the district municipality” and 
the local municipalities’ general competence of “local tourism”. 35 Promotion, he 
says, does not entail interference in the authority of local municipalities to execute 
their listed function. Yet it happens, creating conflict.  
 
The functional area of firefighting is a further example. An executive mayor of a 
district municipality reported that the district had purchased a fire-engine for a local 
municipality but the engine remained parked on district premises because of 
uncertainty as to whose responsibility it was to maintain the vehicle. 36  
 
5.2 Role allocation – shifting of functions 
 
The Structures Act allows for the shifting of functions between district and local 
municipalities through the processes of authorisation by the Minister and adjustment 
by the MEC. This possibility causes uncertainty regarding the responsibility for 
execution of a function and the influence that the shift in function may have on the 
revenue base of a municipality. The uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the 
                                                 
34 Municipal Demarcation Board 2005b, 4. 
35 Interview 16 August 2005. 
36 Interview 7 September 2005. 
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authorizations and adjustments are not subject to any timeframe. In addition, the 
uncertainty also creates the possibility for duplication of services.  
 
Soon after the districts’ establishment, the Ministerial Advisory Committee37 noted 
that the authorisations have resulted in “uncertainty” among municipalities because 
municipalities were “anticipating and insisting that the division of powers and 
functions be adjusted in compliance with section 84 of the Structures Act”. This 
uncertainty had four consequences. First, preparation of an IDP and budget becomes 
difficult, as well as the finalization of organograms, both matters that could adversely 
affect the credit worthiness of municipalities. Second, delay in authorisation might 
lead to insecure employment posts, low work morale and unnecessary resignation. 
Third, practical difficulty arises when departments wish to hand over schemes to local 
government since there is uncertainty as to who is authorised to manage such 
schemes.  
 
The Portfolio Committee found two years later that: “[many municipalities] feel that 
the process of finalizing the division [takes] too long and has not been consultative 
enough…Both district and local municipalities raised the need to provide greater 
certainty and clarity on what precisely the new division of powers and functions are, 
what their technical meanings are, and what the financial implications of these new 
allocations are…and how these overlap with and are distinct.”38  
 
A further consequence of the shift in powers and functions is the unauthorised 
execution of “shifted” functions. For the sake of continuity in the delivery of a 
service, a municipality would continue to deliver a service after the function has been 
shifted away, said a municipal manager of a local municipality.39 What is more, he 
notes, is that the execution of the function is “unfunded” in the sense that the district 
budget reflects execution of the district function and the local municipal budget 
reflects none.  
 
In some case, the shifting of functions has resulted in the duplication of service 
delivery, much to the annoyance of everyone concerned. It was stated by the 
municipal manager of a district municipality that “the province announces a function 
for the district to execute and the local laughs because they know we cannot do it, 
they have to be our agents and can charge us what they like”. 40 Similarly, the 
municipal manager of a local municipality gives an example of duplication saying, 
“[if] we at Mangaung advertise economic development, they will do the same. We 
tend to have two bloated structures. There is also no point in them [the district] having 
a director for water services, when we are performing the function or to have an 
engineer when we already have one.” 41
 
                                                 
37 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Local Government and Transformation 2001, 44. 
38 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 10-11. 
39 Interview 8 September 2005. 
40 Interview 7 September 2005. 
41 Interview 7 September 2005. 
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A great source of conflict is the impact a shift in responsibility when it involves the 
trading services providing vital income through the levying of user charges. This 
conflict arises, explained the Corporate Services Manager of a local municipality, 
when the IDP and the budget must be aligned because of uncertainty in the location of 
the trading services. 42 The Portfolio Committee reported that a district municipality 
also complained, “ the water function has been taken away from us…[we] have to 
have a service delivery role, otherwise [we] will not be able to build our own 
identities. If we deliver services, we can raise revenue. (Otherwise) where do we get 
money from?”43
 
5.3 Redistributive function of districts 
 
One of the functions listed in the MSA for a district municipality is to redistribute 
financial resources to local municipalities.44 Where the channeling of grants, 
conditional and unconditional, must filter through district municipal administration, 
bureaucratic delay may cause conflict. 
 
The Ministerial Advisory Committee anticipated the cause for concern: “Modern 
principles of public financial management are not necessarily promoted by 
compelling two levels of local government (as opposed to the national fiscus) to 
redistribute resources horizontally and vertically”.45 The Portfolio Committee46 noted 
in 2003 that bureaucratic delay was causing conflict.  
 
This concern was repeated in the interviews conducted. The former mayor of a district 
municipality noted that the President correctly observed on many occasions that he 
cannot understand why, when he gets to the communities nothing is happening 
although money has been allocated.47 The answer, the former mayor suggests, can be 
found by studying the channels through which the money is to reach the communities. 
He argues that it should be the municipality closest to the communities who should 
get the funds directly. 
 
The detrimental effect of bureaucratic delay on local economic development is best 
illustrated by the following example given by the corporate services manager of a 
local municipality.  
 
“We submit our budgets at the end of May so that by the end of July we will be 
able to start with our projects. The district, however, submits their budget later so 
that we only receive our approval in October/November by which time it is too 
late to start because it is December/January period and when we return, it is 
February and the end of the financial year. Five months are wasted by a 
bureaucratic block.” 48
                                                 
42 Interview 7 September, 2005. 
43 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 11. 
44 S 84(1)(o). 
45 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 53. 
46 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 10. 
47 Interview 16 August 2005. 
48 Interview 7 September, 2005. 
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5.4 Accountability for services rendered 
 
When end-user service functions (water, electricity, sanitation and health) were 
allocated to district municipalities, the complaint was local municipalities, being the 
first line of contact with the public, will carry the brunt of consumer dissatisfaction 
with those services. The Ministerial Advisory Committee argued that political 
accountability and the democratic process would be undermined by the split in direct 
service provision: “District municipalities do not have ward and residents do not have 
access to ward councillors. Therefore, transferring the bulk of local municipal 
services to districts undermined the principle of open, accountable and democratic 
government and relatively easy access to decision-making, as district municipalities 
are removed from local communities.” 49
 
Local municipalities, reported the Portfolio Committee, are the target of consumer 
dissatisfaction and recipients of complaints about inadequate service delivery in local 
areas. 50 They bare the brunt for irresponsibility in administering resources, and hence 
they argue “we are on the ground, we feel the heat from the people, not the districts”. 
Residents do not understand the distinction between a district service provider and a 
local service facilitator. It is for this reason, said a councillor from a local 
municipality, “the conflict is caused because people don’t understand what is the 
district and what is the local [they] complain to us”. 51   Having to carry the can for 
services they are not responsible for, has not improved local municipalities’ 
relationship with their districts. 
 
5.5 Political differences 
 
Having two political structures that must cooperate on numerous matters sets the stage 
for political contestation. The logic of the structure is that with 60 per cent of the 
councillors being local representatives, the local councils should dominate the district 
council. However, this is not the case as the many conflicts between district and local 
suggest. An obvious source of conflict is where different political parties govern at 
district and local level. However, the Portfolio Committee has noted that intra –party 
differences are also played out in the two councils. 52  
 
Inter-party competition has been prevalent. When asked about the nature of the 
relationships between the district and local municipalities, an acting municipal 
manager of a district municipality responded that in the past there had not been 
cooperation. 53 In his opinion the main reason was that the strong local municipalities 
in the district differed in their political make-up to that of the district. He also said that 
one of the reasons for intervention in a local municipality, was the political history of 
                                                 
49 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Local Government and Transformation 2001. 54. 
50 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 10. 
51 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 10. 
52 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government, 12. 
53 Interview 15 August 2005. 
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municipal government in the area: “The local municipal political problems, spilled 
over into the district and there was no cooperation with the council”. 
 
Similarly, a municipal manager of a local municipality54 said that the influence of 
politics on service delivery had caused problems. He said: 
 
“Previously the New National Party (NNP) was in control of the district and the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) was in control of the local. There was continuous 
undermining and the district council decisions did not go back to the local council. 
The opposing parties who had control of the leadership of the two councils were at 
each other, which affected the service delivery. In our case, our majority party was 
not the one in control of the district and so our concerns were not prioritized. Now 
that we are both ANC, I can see how the concerns of the opposing party’s 
municipality are being sidelined.”  
 
Both municipal managers note that politicization of matters had a negative impact on 
service delivery in the district area. 
 
These are by no means isolated examples. Inter-political conflict is further illustrated 
by the “ANC and UDM war over water”. The Sunday Times55 reported conflict over 
the provision of water services by the ANC-controlled OR Tambo district 
municipality as opposed to the UDM-controlled King Sabata Dalindyebo local 
council, to the populous Umtata area. It was reported that the mayor of King Sabata, 
Dowa Mgudlwa, took the adversarial route in claiming that the provincially-supported 
district municipality was trying to deprive his cash strapped municipality of revenue. 
The district municipality claimed that the mayor was failing to provide reliable 
services to the district and withholding water supply to the rural areas. According to 
district officials “the UDM has undermined good relations between the two 
municipalities by failing to cooperate on service delivery initiated by the district.” The 
King Sabata mayor said that “the provincial government has starved the local 
municipality of much needed funds and have snubbed his attempts to discuss the 
issue.”  
 
Finally, KwaZulu-Natal Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs56 
also reported that the chief conflict-generating stimulus in the province was political 
strife among district municipalities and their constituent local municipalities. A local 
municipality with a different majority party control is sidelined and ignored in 
decision-making and will rarely receive project funding. A lack of commitment to 
cooperative relations, he says, must be overcome to improve district-local relations. 
 
5.6 Capacity status  
 
 
                                                 
54 Interview 16 August 2005. 
55 ‘Eastern Cape becomes election battleground’ Sunday Times (22 February 2004). 
56 Mr M Staniland, manager of local government in the Department of Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal (27 October 2005). 
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A further cause of conflict is the status accorded by the National Treasury in terms of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act to municipalities. For the implementation of 
the MFMA, the National Treasury has classified municipalities into high, medium and 
low capacity municipalities. From the date of coming into operation the MFMA 
applied to all high capacity municipalities while the low capacity municipalities have 
three years grace, with medium capacity municipality falling in between. An 
unforeseen consequence of this classification is the strife it would cause between a 
district and a local municipality with different status.  
 
The implication of a high capacity local municipality in relation to a medium or low 
capacity district municipality is illustrated by the following sentiment expressed by an 
executive district mayor: “We feel honoured when [local municipality with a high 
capacity status] attends one of our meetings”. 57 Conversely, a district with a higher 
grade as a local municipality may look down on the latter. This was acknowledged by 
a district municipal manager: “the district will make makes decisions on behalf of the 
local municipality because it has a low capacity grading.” 58  
 
5.7 Overlording  
 
Questions have also been raised whether the districts are assuming the role of “big 
brother or sister” over their constituent local municipalities. Although the two-tiered 
system of local government is not supposed to be hierarchical, signs of status 
differentiation have been reported, giving rise to conflict. The Portfolio Committee59 
reported a district municipal councillor saying that “there needs to be a big brother or 
sister” and that “local municipalities insist that they are autonomous and refuse to 
acknowledge the district’s role.” This role of the district is then portrayed as one of 
saving local municipalities from financial ruin. A district councilor60 expressed this 
sentiment in saying “[poor] B’s (local municipalities) see us as their Messiah”. This 
view is confirmed by the manager for local government in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs.61 The perception is thus 
that redistributive function of districts along with the provision of direct services give 




The combination of conflict generating factors has made some local municipalities to 
question the need for districts. The Portfolio Committee reported disenchantment with 
the two-tiered system in that certain local municipalities said, “we have doubts about 
the need for districts”. 62 It was also said that strong local municipalities expressed the 
fact that they possessed the capacity to fulfill powers and functions allocated to the 
district municipality and doubted the district municipality’s capability to do so. More 
                                                 
57 Interview 7 September 2005. 
58 Interview 7 September 2005. 
59 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 11. 
60 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government 2003, 11 
61 Mr M Staniland, manager of local government in the Department of Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal (27 October 2005). 
62 National Assembly: Portfolio Committee on Provincial and Local Government 2003, 10. 
 19
recently, the forthcoming abolishment of the RSC levy has put further question marks 
behind district municipalities. A district municipal manager noted that the Minister’s 
announcement that RSC levies may be withdrawn from district municipalities was 
made too early. 63 With the RSC levies constituting the bulk of district, municipal 
income, “the Minister’s announcement,” he said, “had an unanticipated effect, on the 
view held by local municipalities, on the future of district municipalities and, 
compounded the view of some that district municipalities were unnecessary.”  
 
6. MANAGING CONFLICTS 
 
Although there are mumbling among local municipalities about the need for district 
municipalities, their place in the local government dispensation is not questioned at 
the national or provincial levels. Indeed, the IRFA has strengthened the position of 
districts by making them the partner in provincial-local relations; in the Premier’s 
Coordinating Forum the Premier meets with the mayors of districts and metro’s and 
only one representative of organized government. Given this reality the conflict-
generating conditions must be addressed. This, of course, is one of the objectives of 
the district intergovernmental forums. This begs the question whether the DIFs would 
be suitable institutions for this task. 
 
6.1 Nature of conflicts 
 
To manage the conflicts that arise between district and local municipalities, the 
sources of these conflicts must be addressed. Three principal sources can be 
identified: 
• the rules of the two-tiered system of local government,  
• interventions from the national and provincial executives, and  
• the intergovernmental relations within districts. 
 
First, some of the conflict-generating conditions flow from the rules of the two-tiered 
system. The lack of clarity on powers and functions, leading to shared competencies 
and the resultant contestation and duplication, flows from the definitions in the MSA. 
Moreover, the confused role of district municipalities – some being service providers 
and other not - stems from an ambiguous national policy.  
 
Second, the uncertainty on the allocation of powers and functions and their shifting to 
and fro, is in itself a source of conflict. Moreover, the manner in which these 
provisions have been used by the national and provincial executives has exacerbated 
tension. The capacity assessment of municipalities by the National Treasury for 
purpose of the MFMA has had unforeseen consequences by aggravating already 
strained relations between the two tiers.  
 
Third, much of the conflicts originate from the municipalities themselves. Local 
municipalities have not always invested in the district councils by electing the local 
leadership to the district council. Poor communication with residents has left 
communities confused about who should be held accountability for poor service 
                                                 
63 Mr B Molotsi, municipal manager, Northern Free State district municipality (8 September 2005). 
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delivery. Party politicking has also stood in the way of cooperative relations. The 
attitude of both sides to the place and role of the other is a further contributing factor 
to poor relations. An overlording attitude by districts does not lead to constructive 
relations, nor a questioning attitude by local of the very existence of districts, leads to 
cooperative government. 
 
Given these sources of conflicts, a two-pronged approach to district-relations is 
required. The first approach entails the clarification of the division of powers and 
functions, while the second focuses on the improvement of relations through the 
establishment of district intergovernmental forums. 
 
6.2 Clarification of powers and functions of district municipalities  
 
The first step in dealing with poor district-local relations is to examine the 
institutional arrangements and fine tune them if required. In particular greater clarity 
is required with the role definitions contained in section 84(1) of the Structures Act. 
The framework developed for the definition of Schedules 4B and 5B in the first paper 
of this project, 64 finds application also with regard to defining district powers and 
functions.  
 
Definitions of district powers and functions are sector-specific requiring a detailed 
analysis of each functional area. To devise appropriate definitions, a three step process 
should be followed: 
 
(a) Develop and adopt official guideline definitions;  
(b) Develop and adopt statutory definitions; and 
(c) If required, negotiate the practical implementation of definitions.  
 
The first step is to develop a set of guideline definitions that will guide all spheres of 
government in the exercise of their constitutional powers. The Minister responsible for 
local government can issue such regulations in terms of section 92 of the Municipal 
Structures Act in order to provide a holistic approach to district powers and functions. 
The aim of the Guidelines is three-fold: 
(a) They will give district and local municipalities guidance with regard to the ambit 
of their powers and functions.  
(b) They will guide the national and provincial departments when they draft statutory 
definitions of powers and functions concerned with a particular sector of 
government. 
(c) They will guide the provincial governments in defining the scope of their 
monitoring and support functions with regard to municipalities. 
 
The Guideline definitions would not, however, have the binding force of law, but would 
provide municipalities and sector departments at both national and provincial level with a 
framework in terms of which the details of a particular functional area can be determined. 
The Guidelines should be developed in consultation with the various line departments 
and local government to achieve an informed and sector-specific definition as possible.  
                                                 
64 Steytler &, Fessha 2005. 
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The clarification of the powers and functions of district should be accompanied by a 
policy clarification on the overall function of district municipalities. The ambiguous 
position of districts, where some are services providers and others are coordinators, is 
not conducive to sound government within provinces. The uncertainty about the 
duration of executive allocations does not promote good planning. What is required is 
a clear policy on districts: what will their role be over the next decade?  Clarification 
around the basic premises of the institution would give guidance to the respective 
municipalities’ interaction with one another. 
 
The second step is sector specific legislation. All three spheres of government may adopt 
definitions of the local government competences. The national and provincial 
governments may do so in terms of their supervisory legislative authority, while district 
municipalities can define their powers in by-laws within the confines of the framework of 
the MSA. Any such definitions should be guided by the Guidelines issued by the DPLG, 
which may meet to some extent the dangers of over- or under-inclusiveness of 
definitions.  
 
Before any national or provincial law is adopted defining local government competences, 
a full process of consultation with local government should have been conducted. This 
must occur in terms of section 154(2) of the Constitution as further elaborated in the 
IFRA. Of relevance are the intergovernmental forums where legislation affecting local 
government must be discussed.  
 
A district municipality can define the ambit of its powers and functions in a by-law. Such 
by-law is, however, subject to valid national and provincial laws. To assist municipalities, 
and to give effect to their duty of support, both the national and provincial governments 
may issue standard by-laws, defining, among other things, municipal competences.  
 
The final step towards defining competences is using the political process of 
cooperative government whereby the contours of district powers can be finally settled. 
This can be done through the conclusion of protocols and memoranda of 
understanding on a particular competency through the DIFs.  
 
6.3 District intergovernmental forums (DIFs) 
 
While the first step is to demarcate the distinctness of district and local municipalities, 
the second step is aimed at facilitating closer, cooperative relations between them. 
Already before the enactment of the IRFA, in many, if not most, districts 
intergovernmental forums were initiated to facilitate good relations. In some 
provinces the initiative came from the provincial government. In most provinces it 
were the municipalities in the district themselves that took the initiative, convening 
the mayors in a consultative forum. The details of these forums and their functioning 
are set out in the accompanying paper prepared by the Community Law Centre.65 The 
IRFA has now institutionalized these forums.  
 
                                                 
65 Steytler, Fessha and Kirkby 2005. 
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Given the broad mandate of the DIFs, the question is whether they would be able to 
impact constructively on the relationship between district and local municipalities. 
Would these institutions be able to address some or all of the conflict-generating 
conditions that bedevil district-local relations? It is submitted that they may well deal 
with some but not all of the issues, depending on the source of the conflict. 
 
First, while role definition should be tackled by the Department of Provincial and 
Local Government through the issuing of regulations clarifying the definitions, no 
definition answers all questions. There will always be room for interpretation. As was 
suggested with regard to the demarcation of powers and functions between the 
provinces and local government, the final step towards defining competences is using 
the political process whereby the contours of competences can be finally settled. 66 
This can be done through the conclusion of protocols and memoranda of 
understanding on a particular competency. The DIFs are tailor-made for such a 
function. 
 
Second, the conflicts generated by the municipalities themselves are eminently 
suitable to be addressed in these forums. Where the redistributive function of the 
districts is marred by bureaucratic delay, the DIFs are the institutions were such issues 
are raised and dealt with. On the other hand, DIFs may be constrained to deal with 
accountability issues when residents place complaints about service delivery at the 
wrong door. One of the greatest challenges for DIFs is to deal with political 
differences. Reaching agreement and unity of purpose is no great achievement where 
it happens within a single party as negotiations usually take place outside the forum 
and within party structures. The true test of effective intergovernmental relations is to 
negotiate across party lines. This is the essence of multi-party democracy in practice. 
Again, the DIFs are the suitable instrument through which the interest of the district 
as whole could be pursued jointly. Finally, through the consultative nature of a DIF, 
the political leadership of a district may deal with perceptions of overlording and 
questioning of the district’s existence. 
 
There are obviously matters that fall outside the sphere of influence of DIFs. Where 
the uncertainty of the allocation of functions stems from the national or provincial 
governments, DIFs can’t remedy it. They can, however, present a negotiated view to 
the other governments on the appropriate allocation of a particular function.  
 
6.4 Further research 
 
This paper has identified key problems besetting the functioning of districts. In the 
accompanying paper, the efforts by district themselves (sometimes with the assistance 
of the province) to deal with those problems are fully explored. That paper provides 
the baseline study in terms of which the impact of the IRFA can be measured. Will 
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8. ANNEXURE 1: Section 84 Structures Act and executive authority to shift  
powers and functions 
 
Functions which 






Potable water supply systems 
Bulk supply of electricity which includes for the purposes 
of such supply, the transmission, distribution and, where 
applicable, the generation of electricity 
Domestic waste water and sewage disposal systems 
Municipal health services 
 
Functions which 





Solid waste disposal sites, in so far as it relates to – 
(i) the determination of a waste disposal strategy; 
(ii) the regulation of waste disposal; 
(iii) the establishment, operation and control of 
waste disposal sites, bulk waste transfer facilities and 
waste disposal facilities for more than one local 
municipality in the district. 
Municipal roads which form an integral part of a road 
transport system for the area of the district municipality as 
a whole 
Regulation of passenger transport services 
Municipal airports serving the area of the district 
municipality as a whole 
Fire fighting services serving the area of the district 
municipality as a whole, which includes— 
(i) planning, coordination and regulation of fire 
services; 
(ii) specialized fire fighting services such as 
mountain, veld and chemical fire services; 
(iii) co-ordination of the standardization of 
infrastructure, vehicles, equipment and procedures; 
(iv) the training of fire officers. 
The establishment, conduct and control of fresh produce 
markets and abbatoirs serving the area of a major 
proportion of the municipalities in the district. 
The establishment, conduct and control of cemetries and 
crematoria serving the area of a major proportion of the 
municipalities in the district. 
Promotion of local tourism for the area of the district 
municipality. 
Municipal public works relating to any of the above 






9. ANNEXURE 2: Table of interviews conducted 
 
Province Municipality Interviewees 
 
Western Cape Eden 
(district) 
Mr Lott, municipal manager 
 
Mr A Lamont, manager of tourism (ex-mayor) 
 
Western Cape Hesseqa 
(local) 
Mr J Jacobs, municipal manager 
Western Cape Cape Winelands 
(district) 
Mr K Chetty, municipal manager 
 
Western Cape Swellendam 
(local) 
Mr K Gordon, manager of corporate services 
Free State Motheo 
(district) 
Ms K Choene, executive mayor 
Ms T F Kgosidintsi, municipal manager 
 
Free State Northern Free 
State 
(district) 
Mr B Molotsi, municipal manager 
Free State Mangaung 
(local) 
Mr M Matole, city manager 
Free State Moqhaka 
(local) 
Mr Lebona, mayor 
Mr V Senkhane, manager of corporate services 
 
Free State Metsimaholo Mr K Mahlatsi, municipal manager 
(local) 
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